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Enterprise and Society Advance Access originally published online on January 4, 2006
Enterprise and Society 2006 7(1):174-176; doi:10.1093/es/khj011
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Published by Oxford University Press 2006.

Peter Z. Grossman, ed. How Cartels Endure and How They Fail: Studies of Industrial Collusion. Cheltenham, U.K., and Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, 2004. vi + 324 pp. ISBN 1-85898-830-6, $115.00.

The first 10% of the full text of this article appears below.

Economics textbooks teach us that, in general, cartels are unstable, inefficient, bad for the public good, and (at least in the United States) illegal. The eleven chapters in this provocative book dispel such generalities. Through cross-sectional surveys and case studies, the authors explore various definitions of success and failure in understanding the rise and fall of cartels. The available empirical findings "do not always conform to the textbook, or even the sophisticated game theoretic, models" (p. 2).

In a succinct introduction Grossman asks, . . . [Full Text of this Article]

Kwan Man Bun

University of Cincinnati


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