Enterprise and Society Advance Access originally published online on March 6, 2009
Enterprise and Society 2009 10(2):335-375; doi:10.1093/es/khp005
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Between Agnelli and Mussolini: Ford's Unsuccessful Attempt to Penetrate the Italian Automobile Market in the Interwar Period
PIER ANGELO TONINELLI is professor of Contemporary and Business History at the Department of Economics, University of Milano-Bicocca. Contact information: Dipartimento di Economia Politica, Università di Milano-Bicocca, piazza Ateneo Nuovo 1, 20126 Milan. E-mail: pierangelo.toninelli{at}unimib.it.
This article discusses a chapter of the interwar history of the Ford Motor Company in Europe rather neglected by historians, namely its unsuccessful attempt to erect a solid base of operations in Italy. Expansion onto the Italian market had been part of the post-WWI Ford's strategy of internationalization. It seemed to go well beyond the exploitation of an additional demand as its most interesting and promising aspect was the utilization of the Italian branch as a bridgehead into the Balkans, the East Mediterranean region, the Middle East, and North-East Africa. At the beginning this strategy turned out successful. But when in the late 1920s the Company tried to strenghten its position in the country—either setting up its own assembly plant or establishing a joint venture with an Italian firm—its attempt was blocked. To date scholars have focused exclusively on the political and economic barriers to entry erected by the fascist regime, urged by the powerful Fiat lobby. This was certainly the main cause. Yet, this study shows that on several occasions Ford hesitated and even hung back from acting. Therefor a few chances were missed: the most glamorous being an agreement with Fiat itself, so far ignored by historiography.
My deepest gratitude goes to Carol Whittaker of the Ford Archives at the Benson Ford Research Center in Dearborn, who on my behalf performed superb research throughout the files concerning Italy, and to Grazia Tatò, Director of the Trieste State Archives, who helped me in searching the collections there located. Next I wish to thank Franco Amatori, Beppe Berta, Renato Giannetti, Mario Gilli, Valerio Varini, and Michelangelo Vasta for their useful remarks on a first draft of the paper. I am also indebted to Lina Galvez-Munoz, Gabriel Tortella, and the participants to Section III B of the 11th EBHA Annual Conference in Geneva (September 2007)—"International Business under Dictatorship"—for their insightful comments. Last but not least I am truly grateful to two anonymous referees for their critical observations and precious suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.